INTRODUCTION
Universalism -the idea that a multinational debtor's "home country" should have worldwide jurisdiction over its bankruptcyhas long had tremendous appeal to bankruptcy professionals. Yet, the international community repeatedly has refused to adopt conventions that would make universalism a reality. In an article published last year, I proposed an explanation.2 Universalism can work only in a world with essentially uniform laws governing bankruptcy �nd priority among creditors -a world that does not yet exist.
Because it is impossible to fix the location of a multinational com pany in a global economy, the introduction of universalism in current world circumstances would give each multinational company a choice of countries in which to file. By its choice, the company could choose not only the procedure for its bankruptcy, but also the substantive rights its creditors would have. Universalism would require other na tions to recognize the effects of that strategic choice. Given the huge amounts of money potentially at stake, governments rightly fear that opportunism would run rampant. 3 Universalists insist that the requirement that bankruptcies occur in the "home country" of the multinational company would prevent fo rum shopping. They premise their defense of universalism on the as sumption that each multinational company would have one home country and that everyone could know in advance which it was.4 Yet, no universalist writer has been able to define "home country" with any specificity or to describe how their system reliably could determine it.
In this essay, I again raise the three specific questions regarding home countries that universalists seem unable to answer. First, when the principal assets, operations, headquarters, and place of incorpora tion are in diff erent countries, which is the "home country"? Second, does "home country" refer to the home country of a corporate group or does each corporation in the group have its own "home country"? Third, what rules will govern the inevitable changes in the "home country" that occur after credit has been extended? The inability of the two prominent universalists writing in this symposium to answer these questions, suggests that they are, indeed, unanswerable.
I agree with Professor Westbrook5 that it is likely that the global ization of business eventually will harmonize the now-divergent debt collection and insolvency systems of the countries of the world, mak ing conditions ripe for universalism.6 That may take decades, how ever, or even centuries. The issue is what to do while we are waiting for the "new world" society -essentially, a world government -to arrive.7 I believe it is to continue to apply principles of sovereigntyterritoriality. Westbrook believes it is for countries -and even indi vidual judges -to begin implementing universalist principles on a piecemeal basis today.8
Responding to the universalist ideal, some bankruptcy judges al ready surrender assets to "home country" courts that will distribute them differently. Westbrook applauds these surrenders as steps along the road to universalism,9 and he attempts to excuse the injustice to the individual creditors involved by noting that, if the courts of other nations did the same, there might be a "Rough Wash" in which all naquiry to the law of one country (the debtor's home country) .... " ). But see infra text ac companying note 65 (Professor Westbrook, the leading universalist, acknowledging that in some cases creditors will have to assume that more than one country might be the debtor's home country). 5. See Jay Lawrence Westbrook, A Global Solution to Multinational Default, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2276, 2292-97 (2 000 ) (arguing that the bankruptcy systems of the world will con verge over an unspecified period of time).
6. Professor Westbrook seems to me to make too much of this agreement. First, whether the conditions will ever be ripe for world government is mere speculation on both our parts. Second, I do not agree with Westbrook that even the inevitability of a particular system existing in such a distant, speculative future is a justification for adopting aspects of that system today. Half a loaf is usually better than none, but half a system is usually just a mess.
7. The term is Westbrook's. See id. at2276.
8. Westbrook, supra note 5, at 2323 n. 1 97 (praising cases in which bankruptcy courts have surrendered assets for distribution under foreign law that differed from that of the fo rum).
9. See id. at 23 1 9 ("I am convinced that modified universalism is the best transitional rule, because it moves us in the right direction -toward true universalism .... " ).
tions received about as much value as they gave.10 Westbrook's analy sis ignores that it is creditors, not nations, that have entitlements in bankruptcy estates. The creditor that goes unpaid because its country surrenders the assets to a foreign court for distribution according to the foreign country's laws is not consoled by the fact that some other creditor of the same nationality received a windfall from that foreign court in another case.
Part I of this Essay describes the current, territorial system for in ternational bankruptcy and the potential for international cooperation within it. Part II explains the significance of the universalists' inability to answer the three questions posed above, and adds a fourth. Part III responds to the attacks that Professors Guzman and Westbrook make on territoriality, and Part IV considers Professor Rasmussen's thought-provoking contractualist approach to international insol vency. Part V concludes that territoriality continues to provide the soundest basis for international cooperation in present world circum stances and for the reasonably foreseeable future.
I. TERRITORIALITY
Territoriality -the idea that each country has the exclusive right to govern within its borders11 -is such a basic principle of interna tional law that it often goes unnoticed. It is the default rule in every substantive area of law, including constitutional law, taxation, trade marks, industrial regulation, debt collection, and bankruptcy.12 When applied to the bankruptcy of a multinational company, territoriality means that the bankruptcy courts of a country have jurisdiction over those portions of the company that are within its borders and not those portions that are outside them. Some nations claim "extraterri torial effect" for their bankruptcy systems, but they recognize thatabsent treaties or conventions to the contrary -they can enforce their laws only against assets or persons within their own borders.13 With respect to bankruptcy, such treaties and conventions are virtually non-10. See Westbrook, supra note 1, at 465 ("The central argument for the Rough Wash is that a universalist rule will roughly even out benefits and losses for local creditors, who will gain enough from foreign deference to the local forum in one case to balance any loss from local deference to the foreign forum in another."). 12 See, e.g., 4 J. THOMAS MCCA RTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRA DEMA RKS AND UN FA IR COMPETITION § 29:1 (4th ed. 1996) (noting that international trademark law is "territorial"). ) (manuscript at 6, on file with author) (noting that even though extraterritorial bankruptcy laws are in many cases "mere overreaching that has no actual foreign impact" such laws nevertheless allow for the possibility of enforcement by willing countries).
But see
existent. Territoriality is currently the international law of bank ruptcy.14 Most multinational companies have responded to territoriality by placing their holdings in each country in a separate corporation, formed under local law. Some of these local subsidiaries are free standing, self-sufficient businesses that the local country can reorgan ize or liquidate in accordance with local law. But other local subsidi aries may own only the local assets of an integrated, international business. And, in yet other cases, a foreign entity may own local assets directly. In these latter two circumstances, international cooperation may be needed to reorganize the business or liquidate its assets for the best price.
In a territorial system, the necessary international cooperation takes place in each case. That is, "parallel" bankruptcy proceedings are initiated in each country in which the corporate group has substan tial assets. Each court appoints a "representative" for the estate of each entity filing in its jurisdiction. Those representatives then negoti ate a solution to the debtor's financial problems. If the estates are worth more in combination than they are separately, it will be in the interests of the representatives to combine them.
Problems may arise because the bankruptcy laws of particular countries do not authorize cooperation, even when cooperation would increase the value of the local estate. But a country that will not authorize cooperation on a limited territorial basis will certainly not do so on the much more extensive basis of universalism. As a conse quence, these deficiencies in authorization in no way bolster the case for universalism.15
As the international bankruptcy system currently operates, the ap plication of territorial principles to multinational cases presents no se rious problems. When the debtor's financial problems are confined to the entities located in a single country, the distressed entity or entities reorganize or liquidate in that country, and the foreign entities are un affected. When a multinational company's financial problems extend across borders, each financially distressed entity files for bankruptcy in each country where it has significant assets. The effect is to create at least one bankruptcy estate in each country. The representatives of those estates negotiate and obtain court approval of an agreement ("protocol") that provides the terms for cooperation in the particular 14. See, e.g. , Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Th e Lessons of Maxwell Communications, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 2531, 253 2 (1996) (acknowledging that, as between universalism and ter ritoriality, territoriality is "the one most often applied").
15. The reasons why even a universalist system would require ex post cooperation among countries are discussed infra in the text accompanying notes 19-20 and in note 95.
case.16 In theory, the representatives of a multinational company's es tates might fail to agree on a protocol. But territoriality's detractors, as yet, offer no examples of cases in which that has occurred.
The representatives negotiate in light of what would happen if they do not reach an agreement. Absent an agreement, the assets in each country would be reorganized or liquidated and the proceeds distrib uted in accord with the laws of that country. For example, assume that a financially distressed entity has assets in the United States and Canada. The entity would file in both countries, an estate would be created in each, and the courts of each country would appoint a repre sentative of the estate in that country. Unless the representatives agreed otherwise, the U.S. assets would be distributed in accord with U.S. law and the Canadian assets would be distributed in accord with Canadian law. In this context, "U.S. law" would include U.S. conflicts rules, but bankruptcy conflict rules generally direct that the court look to local law in the distribution of a bankruptcy estate.17 The result is that the priority rules of the country where an asset is located typically determine the key issue in any bankruptcy case -who shares in the asset and in what proportion.
The system of territoriality described here is not one that I pro pose. It is the system currently operating in the world. Thus, it is the system that should be compared to the form of modified universalism that Westbrook would implement without waiting for the adoption of an international convention.18 II. UNIVERSALISM "Universalism" is the term ordinarily used to refer to a world bankruptcy system in which a single court -that of the debtor's "home country" -would have jurisdiction over a debtor's assets, wherever located, and distribute them in accordance with the law of that country. The term "pure universalism" is used to refer to a uni versalist system in which law enforcement officers in all countries are bound to enforce the orders of the court of the home country. Even the strongest advocates of universalism realize that this pure form of 17. See, e.g., 11U.S.C. §304(c){4) {1994) (authorizing the turnover of U. S. assets to for eign bankruptcy proceedings "consistent with ... distribution of proceeds of such estate sub stantially in accordance with the order prescribed by [the United States Bankruptcy Code]").
18. Westbrook seems to agree that this is the appropriate comparison. See Westbrook, supra note 5, at 2307-08 {"I will therefore compare theoretical, future universalism as I have described it above with Professor LoPucki's theoretical, 'conventionalized' territorialism as presented in his widely read article in the Cornell Law Review. I will then compare modi fied universalism with the current system of territorialism.").
universalism is so contrary to prevailing notions of sovereignty as to be unthinkable in current world circumstances.19 No country will permit foreign courts to make and directly enforce orders within its borders. In the most common use of the term "universalism," the user contem plates that local courts in each affected country will be obligated by local law or international convention to enforce orders of the home country court. As I have put it elsewhere, "one court plays the tune, and everyone else dances."20 Thus, universalism is not a single-court system, but merely a dominant-court system.
The term "modified universalism" refers to yet a looser form of control. Under modified universalism, the local courts each have some degree of freedom to decide whether compliance with requests emanating from the home country is appropriate.21 The legal standard might be that compliance will not alter the entitlements of the parties or that it will not offend the public policy of the complying country. Modified universalism under the first of these two possible standards -the strain adopted by the United States in Bankruptcy Code section 304 -is virtually indistinguishable from territoriality. That is, all dis tributions from local assets are made in accord with the law of the place where the asset is located at the time of bankruptcy. That distri bution can be made by a foreign court, but only with the express ac quiescence of the local court in the particular case.
A. Westbrook's Proposals
Professor Westbrook advocates universalism in a shot-gun fashion. That is, he advocates a wide variety of universalist systems, whose adoptions are incompatible with one another. They include a single international bankruptcy law administered by a new system of interna tional commercial courts,22 a single international bankruptcy law enforced by national courts,23 national bankruptcy laws enforced by international courts,24 and national laws enforced by national 19. See, e.g., Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Un iversal Priorities, 33 TEX. lNT'L L.J. 27, 28 n.4 {"There is also the notion of 'unity,' which means that one court administers all assets, but that notion is so far from contemporary reality that it is not really part of the working hy pothesis of present scholars.").
20. LoPucki, supra note 2, at 699.
21. Those requests might be from the court or from a representative of the estate.
22. See Westbrook, supra note 5, at 2309 (referring to "a world with a universalist con vention establishing one bankruptcy law and one court system to administer it"); id. at 2293 ("[A] single court system, applying a single set of choice-of-law rules with some hope of con sistency, would produce a far higher level of predictability in commercial transactions than we now have."); id. at 2294 n.87 (referring to "international courts devoted to bankrupt cies").
23. See id. at 2317 {advocating for "Single Law, National Courts").
24. See id. at 2315 {advocating for "Single Court, National Laws").
courts.25 He advocates pure universalism,26 traditional universalism27 and modified universalism.28 He advocates an international conven tion to implement universalism, but does not make it a prerequisite to an attempt to implement any particular type of universalism.29 He suggests that each of these reforms might be made applicable to only "large" multinational companies, without offering a definition of large.30 In an earlier article, he suggested that a "special," non universalist rule would apply to the claims of "unsophisticated credi tors," but has not said what that rule would be. 31 His proposals that require the world to agree on a single law would necessitate revision of not only the bankruptcy laws of all nations, but also the laws governing creditor priority, setoff, and security interests. In addition, each country would have to revise its laws governing debt collection in the absence of bankruptcy to make them compatible with the new bankruptcy law. In the absence of a world government, once such a universal bankruptcy law was adopted, it would be difficult to change. Given the low level of experience that the world has with al ternative bankruptcy regimes, such a terminal project seems prema ture. But if such a law were adopted, it would create the conditions necessary for universalism to work.
Westbrook does not explain how the new network of international bankruptcy courts he proposes would differ from the national courts they would replace, or what advantage they would offer over the cur rent system of national courts. Accordingly, I do not attempt to ad dress that aspect of his proposals.
The fault with Westbrook's proposal to implement modified uni versalism without an international convention -discussed in the in troduction -is already evident in the operation of the system today. The acts of individual judges in surrendering assets to other courts that 25. See id. at2292 (advocating "a uniform set of choice-of-law rules and choice-of-forum rules" as an alternative to "a single international bankruptcy law and a single international bankruptcy court system").
26. See id. at 2293-94 (referring to his "single court system").
27. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
28. See Westbrook, supra note 5, at 230 0 ("Modified universalism is the approach that I have suggested as an interint or transitional solution.").
29. See id. at 2283 (describing the goal of his essay as "elaborating the best global bank ruptcy system that might be created by a multinational convention on this subject").
30. See id. at 2298-99 ("Limited application of a universalist regime only to large multi nationals would permit local policies to be applied to local enterprises."). will distribute them differently frustrate entitlements in, and reduce the predictability of, a system that remains principally territorial.
Professor Westbrook responds that no one is "cheated" by such surrenders of assets because they are merely a "transnational solution to a transnational bankruptcy."32 I take him to mean that be believes creditors of a multinational company should anticipate a universalist distribution of assets and so should not complain when they get one. But the surrenders of assets necessary to achieve such a "transnational solution" are prohibited by reasonably clear language in the United States Bankruptcy Code33 and the world community consistently has refused to provide for them by convention.34 They seldom occur. As a result, there is no reason for creditors to anticipate them. To put it concretely, the workers in a Chrysler plant in Detroit do not expect to have to claim their wages and benefits in a German bankruptcy court and they do not expect the German law of creditor priorities to de termine whether they will be paid. Yet that is precisely what would happen if Daimler Chrysler filed bankruptcy in Germany and a uni versalist United States Bankruptcy judge decided to surrender the as sets of Chrysler to the German court.
The remainder of this Part addresses the proposals by Westbrook, Guzman, and others for the system generally understood to be "uni versalist" -one in which the national court of the multinational's home country implements the national bankruptcy law of that coun try. My assertion that universalists are unable to specify a workable definition of "home country" includes the assertion that they cannot do so by convention. That is not merely because they cannot agree on an answer, but rather, because no answer could render universalism workable.
B. Th e Questions Universalists Cannot Answer
Nearly all of the putative advantages of universalism depend on the assumption that each multinational company has a single home country that will not change over time. The arguments for univer salism fail because no universalist scholar has yet proposed a workable 32 See Westbrook, supra note 5, at 2322. The passage reads: "Indeed, Professor LoPucki's notion that local creditors are somehow cheated of vested rights by a transna tional solution to a transnational bankruptcy lies at the heart of our disagreement." Id.
33. Section 304(c) of the U.S. bankruptcy code provides that "in determining whether to order turnover of property of the estate, or the proceeds of such property, to [a] foreign rep resentative" the action taken shall be "consistent with ... distribution of proceeds of such estate substantially in accordance with the order prescribed by [the U.S. bankruptcy code]." 11 U.S.C. §304(b)(2) and (c)(4).
34.
See, e.g., Guzman, supra note 4, at 2184 ("Despite the near-unanimous support of the academic community, policymakers have chosen not to adopt universalism.").
test or method for identifying that country. Without such a method, universalism cannot be implemented.
Universalism cannot operate without the ability to identify a home country for each multinational company for three reasons. First, the home country's law will determine the priorities of creditors in the debtor's estate. Contrary to the arguments presented by Professors Guzman and Rasmussen,35 large differences exist among the bank ruptcy laws of different countries.36 Several examples illustrate these differences: (1) The laws of some countries treat a creditor with a right of set off as secured; the laws of others treat them as unsecured.37
(2) In some countries tort creditors share pro rata with commercial creditors;38 in other countries, tort creditors are subordinated to com mercial creditors;39 and in yet others, tort creditors who have not yet reduced their claims to judgments before bankruptcy do not share at all.40 (3) In some countries employees are willing to extend substantial credit to their employers, because they know they will have first pri ority -ahead of even secured creditors -in the factories in which they work;41 in other countries such extensions would be foolish be cause employees' priorities are limited sharply or even nonexistent.42 These differences in legal doctrine occur against even sharper differ ences in system operation. In some countries, bribery is common. In others -particularly small nations -the local courts might be under the corrupt influence of a multinational company based there. Some countries do not yet have an operating bankruptcy system. If the iden tity of the home country is arguable or manipulable at the time of bankruptcy, debtors or their creditors could change both substantive rights and likely outcomes, simply by their choices of venue.
35.
See, e.g. , Guzman, supra note 4, at 2195 (arguing that the differences among bank ruptcy regimes' treatment of trade creditors are minor); Robert K. Rasmussen, Resolving Transnational Insolvencies Th rough Private Ordering, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2252, 2273 (2000) (referring to the differences in treatment of tort creditors by different countries as "mar ginal").
36. See LoPucki, sup ra note 2, at 709-11.
37. See, e.g., PHILIP R. WOOD, MAPS OF WORLD FINANCIAL LAW 38-43 (3d ed. 1997) (describing the wide variety of "netting" laws in the countries of the world).
38. This is true, for example, in the United States. See 11 U.S.C. § § 502(b) and 726(a) (1994) (allowing claims and awarding priority without regard to whether the debt is owing for a tort claim). 40. See sources cited in LoPucki, supra note 2, at 709 n.62.
41. See LoPucki, supra note 2, at 710-11.
42. Under U.S. law the employees' priority would be limited to wages earned within the ninety days prior to bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(3) (1994). By agreeing to defer payment without a bankruptcy filing, the employees would be waiving their priority.
Second, under universalism, the validity of transfers the debtor made in the period before bankruptcy would be tested by the laws of the home country.43 Most national bankruptcy systems have laws pro viding for the avoidance of various kinds of transfers made by the debtor in the period before bankruptcy.44 The transfers typically made avoidable include those that had the effect of preferring one creditor over another, those made to insiders, and those that had the effect of reducing an already insolvent estate. But here too, the laws of the various countries differ widely.45 Without a clear identification of the debtor's home country in advance, prefiling transfers would be void able or not, depending on the choice of venue.
Third, under universalism, the courts of debtors' "home countries" will adjudicate the claims of creditors from all over the world. While the home country might, under its own conflicts rules, choose to apply the substantive law of the place where the claim accrued, that is a mat ter that necessarily would be left to the home country.46 The home countries presumably would apply their own procedures to the adjudi cation of the claims -and with them their own notions of due process of law. Thus, the filing of a bankruptcy in some distant part of a uni versalist world could deprive an injured person of his or her right to a trial by jury, to pretrial discovery, or to the effective assistance of counsel -even though the tort was perpetrated by the debtor in the United States and the injury occurred in the United States. The dif ference these changes in "procedure" would make were starkly illus trated in two recent mass tort cases. What was thought to be $3 billion in claims against Union Carbide for the deaths of 4,000 people in Bhopal, India was settled for $470 million when it became apparent the cases would be tried in India rather than in the United States.47 The recent settlement of breast implant claims in the Dow Coming 43. See Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Choice of Avoidance Law in Global Insolvencies, 17 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 499, 500 (1991) ("[A]n avoiding court in a jurisdiction embracing Modi fied Universalism should generally apply home-country law."). Westbrook states: "As a general rule, the avoiding court should apply the home-country avoiding law if it will turn over the proceeds to the home country court for distribution." Id. Under universalism, only the second kind of distribution could occur.
44. See id. at 504 ("Most countries seem to have rules that permit the avoidance of transactions that take place after the inception of a debtor's financial crisis.").
45. See id. at 504-07 (describing the variety of avoidance powers under the laws of vari ous countries); see also In re Maxwell Communication Corp., 93 F.3d 1036 (2d Cir. 1996) (in volving prefiling transfers that were valid under the laws of England but not under the laws of the United States).
46. This follows from the fact that, in a universalist system, the home country has juris diction over all of the debtor's assets. Alternatively, universalists could add a complete set of conflicts rules to the agenda for an international bankruptcy convention.
47. See, e.g., Richard L. Abel, A Critique of Torts, 37 UCLA L. REV. 785, 809 n.81 (1990) ("Union Carbide ultimately settled all claims by paying $470 million to the Indian government.").
bankruptcy expressly gave foreign women lower payments than U.S. women for the same injuries, on the theory that those injuries were worth less under foreign procedures.48 If the identity of the home country were unclear as bankruptcy approached, so would be the val ues of these claims.
1.

Wh ich Country is the "Home Country"?
Despite the importance of the identity of the home country for any particular debtor, universalists have been unable to specify meaningful criteria for its identification. Each of four different bases is plausible. First, most courts and commentators seem to regard the country of in corporation as having the strongest claim to home country status.49 For example, more than half of all large public companies filing for bankruptcy within the United States today file in Delaware rather than in states where their headquarters, assets, and operations are lo cated.so They file there on the basis that Delaware is their jurisdiction of incorporation.s1 Second, companies often are identified with a par ticular country, because the companies are headquartered in that country.s2 Third, if substantially all of the employees, operations, and customers of a large company were in a single country, it is difficult to imagine that country would not be considered the "home country," even if the company's tiny headquarters and place of incorporation were elsewhere.s3 Fourth, the assets of a company can be almost en-48. See LoPucki, sup ra note 2, at 747 n.243 (discussing the plan offering foreign women 35-60% of the amounts offered American women for the same injuries).
49. See, e.g. , Felixstowe Dock and Ry. Co. v. United States Lines, Inc., 2 All E.R. 77, 93 (Q.B. 1988) (noting that "the English practice is to regard the courts of the country of incor poration as the principal forum for controlling the winding up of a company"); IAN F. 51. See id. at 985 n.52 (noting that 89% of the large, public companies that filed for bankruptcy reorganization in the United States from 1980 to 1997 were incorporated in Delaware).
52 See, e.g. , Westbrook, supra note 14, at 2534 (referring to Maxwell as having "its true 'seat' in London, where it was administered and nearly all of its financial affairs ... were managed" even though "its principal assets (were] in the United States in the form of various large operating companies").
53
. TV Filme presents a recent example. That company's business is to provide cable television in Brazil. The headquarters of the company and all of the operations are in Brazil, but the company raised substantial investments through its holding company parent, which is incorporated in Delaware and registered with the U.S. Securities Exchange Commission. On this basis, TV Filme filed for reorganization in Delaware. See TV Filme, Inc. Reports tirely separate from its operations, as might occur when a company rents the factories where its employees work, but has substantial land holdings in another country.
Universalists attempt to dismiss this issue with the assertion that the identity of the home country will be obvious in most cases.54 But that rationale contradicts their basic premise of increasing globaliza tion. No one can deny the existence of a substantial number of multi national companies whose home countries are either not obvious or in flux. That number will grow naturally with the increasing globaliza tion of business. In a prematurely universalist system, that growth might turn malignant, as financially ailing companies jockey to give themselves bankruptcy options.
Perhaps responding to the rampant forum shopping within the United States based on place of incorporation, Guzman and Westbrook both reject place of incorporation as the standard for home country.55 Declining to choose from my list of concrete options, both state a preference for "principal place of business" as the test.5 6 Westbrook defends that choice on the ground that it is a commonplace standard in American law.57 But he ignores two key facts about his choice. First, the American courts have been forced to give specific meaning to the phrase "principal place of business" and have inter preted it to mean essentially the same thing as "headquarters" -one of the concrete choices he rejected.58 Second, the "principal place of Filing Plan of Reorganization, PR NEWSWIRE, Jan. 26, 2000, at Financial News Section (noting that the firm's headquarters and operations are in Brazil but that its place of incor poration and the bankruptcy case are in the United States. ). I doubt many universalists would assert that the United States is TV Film e's "home country. "
The location of the bulk of a company's assets and operations sometimes has been con sidered the most appropriate basis for determining its home country for bankruptcy pur poses. For example, the universalist bankruptcy treaty negotiated (but never implemented ) between the United States and Canada in 1979 used an asset-based test to determine the country that would have jurisdiction. See LoPucki, supra note 2, at 716 n.108.
54.
See, e.g., Guzman, supra note 4, at '2207 (" [T] here is widespread agreement among those interested in transnational insolvency that, in the vast majority of cases, the home country will be easy to identify -making this issue a minor question. "); Ulrik Rammeskow Bang-Pedersen, Asset Distribution in Transnational Insolvencies: Combining Predictability and Protection of Local Interests, 73 AM. BANKR. L. J. 385, 418 (1999) ("[I] n most cases de termination of the home country will be obvious regardless of which standard is used .... ").
55. See Guzman, supra note 4, at 2207 ("[I] f it is too easy for the debtor to select the main jurisdiction, it could choose in such a way as to disadvantage strongly nonadjusting creditors that are likely to interact with the firm . . . . For this reason, a test based on the place of incorporation would be inappropriate. "); Westbrook, supra note 5, at 2316 ("I agree that the law of the place of incorporation is unsatisfactory because of the risk of sham incor poration-: a company organized under a flag of convenience unrelated to the location of its business, management, and assets. ").
56. See Guzman, supra note 4, at 2206-07; Westbrook, supra note 5, at 2316.
57. See Westbrook, supra note 5, at 2316.
business" standard was the basis for rampant forum shopping in U.S. bankruptcies in the 1980s.59
Westbrook also suggests the possibility of a "multidimensional test" based on some combination of factors. He gives the example of a presumption based on place of incorporation "rebuttable only by a clear showing that the center [of the debtor's main interests] was else where. "60 This is the test employed in a model international insol vency law that Westbrook was instrumental in negotiating. Westbrook himself has acknowledged in the past that this test will generate uncertainty:
In those cases where the test does present difficulty, there may well be a "race of creditors" to have a proceeding opened in a favorable forum.
Not too much has been lost, because creditors have had in any event to assume that more than one possible forum exists. At least the possible fora have been limited to those which can fairly assert jurisdiction on the basis that they are the center of the firm's main interests; that is to say, the test still imposes some limitation on the possible fora . . .. 6 1
In other words, Westbrook admits that a multidimensional test will not identify a single home country for each debtor.
Westbrook's willingness to accept a home country standard that merely will narrow the home country of a debtor to one of a few seems grounded in his acceptance of a false analogy between domestic and international bankruptcy.62 Westbrook argues that, because use of such a standard domestically has not led to disaster, use internation ally will not either.63
The analogy, however, does not hold. Large case bankruptcy is a substantial industry. Courts compete for cases within the United States and internationally.64 The effect of having a vague standard for venue nationally has been to give several courts plausible claims to particular cases and there is every reason to believe it would do the 59. See id. at 18 (finding that nine of forty-three $100 million companies reorganizing at their "principal place of business" (21 % ) had "virtually no property or operations other than [their) headquarters in the district").
60. Westbrook, supra note 5, at 2317. Professor Bang-Pedersen seems to favor that test as well. See Bang-Pedersen, supra note 54, at 419. 62 See Westbrook, supra note 5, at 2309 ("To argue for territoriality as the goal of an international system is much the same as arguing for state-by-state bankruptcy within the United States.").
63. See id. at 2316.
64. See, e.g. , LoPucki, supra note 2, at 721. same internationally. There the analogy ends. Domestically, a na tional government and an appellate court system exist to moderate fo rum shopping and its effects.65 The international realm lacks compa rable institutions. Internationally, the only limit on outrageous claims of jurisdiction would be diplomatic protests or wasteful, messy refusals of cooperation by the courts of other nations. More importantly, ram pant domestic forum shopping is not a serious problem, because the bankruptcy law of the United States is a national law that establishes a national system of priorities.66 Approximately the same rules of distri bution are applicable regardless of the forum.67 For Westbrook's analogy between national and international bankruptcy to be sound, a universalist convention equivalent to the U.S. bankruptcy code and the uniform laws that govern security interests, fraudulent transfers, and other subjects within the United States would have to be adopted. In its absence, international forum shopping would effect huge trans fers of wealth among the parties to cases.
Is the "Home Country" That of the Entity or the Group?
Multinational companies are almost invariably corporate groups. Some corporate groups operate a single, indivisible business, such as an airline. Individual corporations within the group may perform spe cific functions, such as holding title to aircraft, conducting operations, or obtaining financing, but none may have a business that could oper ate apart from the other corporations in the group. Such a group is re ferred to as having an "integrated" business.68 At the opposite ex treme, a conglomerate, particularly one that frequently buys and sells businesses, carefully may avoid any interdependence among the busi nesses it owns, so that the group could sell any of them without af fecting the others. Each such business might be owned by a "stand alone" subsidiary. Most corporate groups probably are somewhere between these extremes. They operate businesses that are integrated, to some degree, but that they can, with varying degrees of effort and expense, separate.
Regardless of how one defines "home country," the home country of a corporate group often will be different from the home countries of corporations within the group. For example, assume that Parent Corporation is a holding company whose only significant assets are its 65. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1412 (1994) (authorizing the district courts to tramfer bank ruptcy cases "in the interests of justice or for the convenience of the parties").
66. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § § 506, 726 and 1129(a)(9) (1994). 68. See LoPucki, supra note 2, at 719-20 (discussing the integration test as it is applied to multinational companies by some bankruptcy courts). stock holdings in its three subsidiaries. Parent Corporation is incorpo rated in country P where it maintains its "world headquarters." Each of the three subsidiaries has its place of incorporation, headquarters, and operations in each of three countries other than P. P probably would be considered the home country of the group, but P could not be considered the home country of any subsidiary.
In which "home country" would the bankruptcy of one or more members of this corporate group take place? That is, would all file in the home country of the group? Would each entity file in its own home country? Or might the home country determination depend on which corporations were in financial difficulty, which ones filed, or the degree of integration among them?
No answer to these questions describes a system that could capture the supposed benefits of universalism. A rule that put the bankruptcy of each entity in the home country of the entity would split the bank ruptcy of the group among up to four countries. If the group operated an integrated business, that would, by the universalists' reasoning, prevent the reorganization of the business or the liquidation of its as sets for their best price.69
A rule that put the bankruptcy of the entire group in the home country of the group would lead to anomalous results and the resulting system would be manipulated easily. The anomalous results would occur when only a single, entirely foreign subsidiary was in financial difficulty. Even if that entity did business only in country A and had no ties to country P other than ownership by a holding company lo cated in P, its bankruptcy would take place in P, the home country of the debtor's group. To illustrate, if the stock of the corporation that owned Rockefeller Center in New York had been owned by a Japanese company, the bankruptcy of Rockefeller Center would have been in Japan, even if the Japanese parent had not been in financial difficulty.
The manipulation would occur when P either spun off its ailing subsidiary -to permit it to file in its own home country -or itself was acquired by another company -to permit any member of the re sulting group to file jn the acquirer's home country. Recall that each of these changes would change the law governing the subsidiary's bankruptcy, including the priorities of creditors.70
The spin off or acquisition that triggered a change in applicable law in these scenarios would not have to be of any economic signifi cance. Under the home-country-of-the-group rule, any American company could give the Cayman Islands jurisdiction over its bank-69. See, e.g. , Westbrook, supra note 5, at 2293 ("A single court would improve dramati cally the possibility of reorganization.").
70.
See supra text accompanying notes 36-42.
ruptcy simply by incorporating a holding company there and ex changing the company's shares for those of the holding company.
That is precisely what Fruit of the Loom -a billion dollar company -did in preparation for its recent bankruptcy filing.71 Fortunately, in the current territorial system, that did not give rise to a claim that the United States should surrender the company's U.S. assets to the Cayman Islands court. But, under universalism, it would have.
A rule that chose between the home country of the entity and the home country of the group, depending on the circumstances, would be highly unpredictable.72 All three factors that might determine the proper forum and applicable law -the extent of integration, the ex tent of the financial distress, and which entities filed -would be both unpredictable and manipulable. Much of the integration within any corporate group is unintentional. That is, even though prudent busi ness practices or loan agreements require that a debtor respect the separation among entities, that debtor fails to do so. As a result, inte gration is often a matter of degree. The question may not be whether particular entities could survive on their own, but rather, how much value would be lost if they had to do so. Those in control of a corpo rate group can integrate it by having entities in the group guarantee the obligations of other entities, or by sharing assets such as trade marks, computer systems, or workforce. They could disintegrate it by reversing these transactions.
A rule based on the extent of the financial distress within the cor porate group or on which members of the group filed bankruptcy would be equally unworkable. Within a few days of the time a bank ruptcy case is filed in a jurisdiction, it becomes impractical to transfer the case to another jurisdiction. The case grows roots in the first se lected jurisdiction as the parties retain counsel or organize committees in the jurisdiction. The judge devotes considerable time to familiariz ing him-or herself with the case and makes critical -though some times tentative -rulings. One of those decisions may be the approval of new financing that must be disbursed on an emergency basis. Even within the United States, courts have found it entirely impractical to uproot a case and transfer it to another jurisdiction.73 An international move would be immensely more disruptive, even if there were some way to cause it to occur.
In the early days of many bankruptcy cases, no one but the debtor's managers know how far financial distress extends within the group -and, in some cases, not even they know. Hence, any rule based on the extent of that distress would be vulnerable to mistake, errors in judgment, or outright manipulation. Once a portion of the group were lodged in the forum chosen by the debtor, the system would have no option but to permit the remainder of the group to file there as well -even if a different country were actually the "home" of the entire distressed portion of the group.
Bankruptcy filings that extend to only part of the group are the norm, not the exception. On average, only about a third of the entities of a corporate group join in its filing.74 It is not at all unusual for some members of the group to initiate the case and for additional members to join them later. A rule that looked to the "center of interests" of the filing members of the group would, �hus, be easily manipulable. A group could choose its venue by the order in which its members filed.
The issue of corporate groups is further complicated by the fact that courts sometimes disregard corporate entities or consolidate them. Thus, even if a universalist scheme deemed each entity to be located in that entity's home country, the issue of whether a particular corporation would be treated as an entity for this purpose would re main. To illustrate, assume that the world has adopted a universalist system in which each entity is to file bankruptcy in its own home coun try. Parent Corporation is a Canadian corporation that owns Subsidi ary Corporation, a Mexican corporation. Each has filed bankruptcy in its respective country. Creditors wish to assert that the two corpora tions should be consolidated into one on the ground that assets have been shuffled between the two and their separate existence is a sham. Which country's law should govern the issue and in which country's courts should the matter be litigated? In a universalist system, the in quiry may be circular: which country's law governs depends upon the 73. See GORDON BERMANT ET AL., CHAPTER 11 VENUE CHOICE BY LARGE PUBLIC COMPANIES 7 (1997) (noting that "the longer the original district retains [a] case, the more rational it becomes to retain it"); Eisenberg & LoPucki, supra note 50, at 999-1001 (ex plaining and documenting the inadequacy of transfer as a venue correction mechanism); LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 58, at 24 (relaying that "the likelihood of a change of venue in the ... cases we studied was small"). home country of the existing entity or entities, but what entity or enti ties exist may depend on which country's law governs.
Neither Westbrook nor Guzman even attempts to say how a uni versalist system should fix the location of a multinational company that is a corporate group. Westbrook claims that the problem is "far broader than bankruptcy"75 and that "[t]here can be little doubt that the problem of the legal responsibility of corporate groups will be ad dressed as the world continues to globalize," and then argues that ter ritoriality has no better solution.76
In fact, the territorial solution to the problem of corporate groups is remarkably elegant. It does not rest, as Westbrook claims,77 on an assumption that all assets within a country are owned by the same corporation. Rather, it assumes only that each asset is located in some particular country. The solution is that the law of that country governs whether the asset is available to satisfy any particular debt, regardless of the corporate structure and regardless of whether the applicable body of law is denominated veil piercing, consolidation, agency, sham, or voodoo. The application of that law will be by the local court, and it will have no extraterritorial effect.
For example, assume that, in a territorial system, Parent Corpora tion, which has assets in Canada and Mexico, owns Subsidiary Corpo ration, which also has assets in both. The Canadian court will deter mine how many Canadian estates will exist and the Mexican court will determine how many Mexican estates will exist. Whether their deter minations are consistent on the issue of whether there is one corpora tion or two does not matter: each court's determination will apply only to the assets located in the country.
Both Westbrook and Guzman attempt to undermine the founda tions of territoriality by asserting that the locations of assets are prob lematic. That is certainly not true of tangible assets, such as factories, equipment, and inventory. Westbrook focuses instead on intangible assets, using the example of a bank account. But even though intangi ble assets have no physical location in fact, they do, in most cases, have well-established locations under international law. Westbrook's example will illustrate: 75. Westbrook, supra note 5, at 23 11.
76. Id. at 23 14. Bang-Pedersen makes the same error. See Bang-Pedersen, supra note 54, at 42 0 n. 1 3 6 ("This tricky choice of law question will not be analyzed further here, but it should be noted that territorialism would have to struggle with consolidation choice of law problems as well, unless it is assumed that substantive consolidation never takes place in a territorial system. ") .
77. See Westbrook, supra note 5, at 23 1 2 ("[Professor LoPucki] assumes a model in which corporate groups are neatly arranged in national slots. Each country where the group operates has its own local corporation and all of the assets and liabilities relating to that country are concentrated in that local corporation."). Westbrook provides no cite in support of thi s imputation of claims and I do not recognize them.
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Suppose a bank account in the New York branch of a London bank held in the name of a Mexican corporation. The traditional, fictional choice of-law rule would choose New York law as governing, but there is a sub stantial argument that the worldwide bank has the ultimate obligation to pay. Thus the New York and English courts would have quite plausible claims to jurisdiction over the account on those grounds, while the Mexican bankruptcy court would be following another established doc trine by asserting jurisdiction over the account by virtue of a worldwide in rem jurisdiction over all of its debtor's property. As to power, both New York and London would have contempt power over the bank, while Mexico could order the debtor's officers to comply under pain of con tempt. Which court can "claim" the bank account under a territorial sys tem? All three can do so. The bank and the debtor may well be subject to conflicting orders.78
Westbrook is correct in his conclusion that all three countries may lay claim to the account. But the claims of Mexico and England are not territorial; they are extraterritorial. That is, they are claims to property located outside the claiming country.79 Under international law, the bank account in Professor Westbrook's example is located in New York, because it is in the New York branch of the English bankeven if the branch is not separately incorporated.80 In a territorial sys tem the account would be in the New York estate of the Mexican cor poration. This result follows not from "de facto power" over the bank account as Westbrook asserts,81 but from international understandings regarding the locations of intangible assets worked out over centuries.
What Will Prevent Debtors from Changing Their Home Countries Opp ortunistically After Credit Has Been Extended?
Given the huge differences in the bankruptcy laws of the countries of the world, the incentives to forum shop in a universalist system would be tremendous. The debtor's managers might want a forum that would leave them in control of the company during reorganiza- Cir. 1996) . In that inter national insolvency case, the court had no difficulty in determining the location of any of the bank accounts involved.
81. See Westbrook, supra note 5, at 2308 (asserting wrongly that " 'Cooperative territo rialism' as proposed by Professor LoPucki in his Cornell article is a system in which each country exercises jurisdiction over the assets within its de facto power, without regard to le gal concepts of jurisdiction").
tion rather than appoint a trustee. They might want one that would allow them to cram down a plan of reorganization over the obj ections of their creditors, or one that would attempt to override regulatory laws of some of the countries in which the debtor does business. Par ticular groups of creditors will each want a forum in which the group's claims will have priority. Because any increase in the priority of one group of creditors necessarily is accompanied by a corresponding de crease in the priority of another group, creditor groups will tend to fa vor different fora.
These differing interests will give rise to conflicting strategies in the period prior to bankruptcy. A debtor may seek to improve its claims to an advantageous venue by manipulating the factors relevant to the venue's test of "home country." Large, public companies fre quently change their jurisdictions of incorporation, headquarters, and even operations. For example, Fruit of the Loom is a billion-dollar bankrupt that recently has been engaged in changing all three.82 In a universalist system, companies would have greater incentives to do these things, and so would tend to do them more often. If the home country of the entity were decisive, debtors could expand their choice of fora by dissolving or merging subsidiaries; if the home country of the group were decisive they could acquire or be acquired. If the de gree of integration mattered, they could change it. Ultimately, they could place the bankruptcy in any of the countries in which they had significant contacts.
In a universalist system, creditors might use their leverage over their debtors to influence the debtors' choice of venue. Contractual leverage may not, however, be very effective, because the debtor ap proaching bankruptcy is no longer financially responsible. "Bankrupt debtors," the adage goes, "may breach their contracts with impunity." Creditors may try to cho ose a forum directly by filing an "involuntary" case against the debtor, but, when they do, they may find themselves in a race with others who prefer a different forum.83
82. "Fruit of the Loom is based in Chicago, although most of the manufacturing is done in the West Indies. The business employs 40,000 people worldwide. It was in the process of relocating its head office from Chicago to Kentucky, and most of its manufacturing out of the US [sic], when the business entered Chapter 11 at the very end of last year." Mallon, supra note 71, at 4. The company reincorporated in the Cayman Islands just a few months before filing one of its bankruptcy cases there. See sources cited supra, note 71.
83. Universalists have not said how the matter should be resolved when the courts of two or more countries claim worldwide jurisdiction over the property of a multinational debtor. If they were to adopt the rule applicable within the United States -the court in which the first filing is made controls venue -parties would race to be the first to file. That has been the effect of the rule within the United States. See, e.g. , LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 58, at 28 n.60 (describing the race between Baldwin-United and a group of its creditors to control venue by filing first).
Bankruptcy forum shopping is already rampant among large com panies within the United States.84 This is true even though the gains from it are so subtle that scholars disagree even on what they are.85 U.S. bankruptcy law provides for the transfer of cases on grounds of forum non conveniens, but courts do not transfer them.86 Instead, bankruptcy judges in New York, and later Delaware, have sought to attract cases for the benefit of their local economies.87 The competi tion among districts for these cases is so intense that even the appel late courts have been unable to stem it.88
Under the current, mostly territorial, international regime, the gains from becoming a bankruptcy haven are small. A country can administer only those assets that are within the country or that other countries willingly surrender. Nevertheless, forum shopping is already a significant factor in multinational bankruptcy cases89 and some coun tries -most notably Bermuda and the Cayman Islands -already are developing as international bankruptcy havens.90
In a universalist system, the potential gains to host countries from international forum shopping would be many times greater because all nations would be required to send the debtor's assets to a single forum for distribution according to the law of that forum. The benefit to the forum nation will be in the economic activity it brings to that nation.
In a large bankruptcy case today, the professional fees alone may ex ceed $100 million.91 Although only a portion of those fees will remain with professionals in the haven, a haven's cash flow from a series of 84. See Eisenberg & LoPucki, supra note 50, at 977-79.
85. See, e.g. , id. at 989-91 (detailing an empirical study finding no significant differences in case processing times between Delaware and all other districts); David A. Skeet, Jr., Bankruptcy Judges and Bankruptcy Venue: Some Th oughts on Delaware, 1 DEL. L. REV. 1, 28 (1998) (stating that "Delaware has successfully addressed the single bi ggest problem with Chapter 11 in recent years -the inordinate time and expense of the reorganization proc ess"). such cases may be substantial. Because no international courts of ap peals exist, the only control on this forum shopping would be the re fusal of other countries to honor the forum's rulings. Such refusals probably would be rare, because they would leave the particular debtor's affairs in chaos. Knowing that, some debtors will claim home countries boldly.
See Eisenberg
Creditors may respond to their forum shopping losses by attempt ing to adj ust the terms on which they extend future credit. But their adjustments will be inadequate,92 and will not be visited on either the forum shopper or the haven anyway.93 Havens such as the Cayman Islands and Bermuda will be driven by competition to adopt laws that seek to systematically exploit involuntary and insufficiently adjusting creditors, customers, and other stakeholders. How that can occur is addressed in Section III.B. 93. Bankruptcy is, for the most part, an end game. Those who control the company at filing and choose the forum will not control the emerging company. Thus, it would be irra tional for even adjusting creditors to discriminate against the emerging company on credit terms. In most cases, the creditors will own the emerging company.
Wh at Jurisdiction Is
Nor would the haven need to fear that strongly or weakly nonadjusting creditors would discriminate against borrowers who choose the haven as their home country. Those credi tors cannot know at the time they lend where the debtor's home country will be at the time they try to collect.
94. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 365(a)(3) (1994) (prohibiting changes in certain provisions of shopping center leases); 11 U.S.C. §1113 (1994) (detailing the requirements for rejection of a collective bargaining agreement); 11 U.S.C. § 1114 (1994) (requiring the continued pay ment of retiree benefits during chapter 11 reorganization); 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (1994) (giving bankruptcy courts jurisdiction over certain actions and prohibiting them from assuming ju risdiction over others).
I cannot imagine that the United States would allow other nations' bankruptcy systems to override U.S. choices with respect to these kinds of bankruptcy questions. The answers are too integrally a mat ter of public policy. For example, imagine that, in the exercise of its "bankruptcy jurisdiction" in a universalist system, a Brazilian court authorized a reorganizing Brazilian forest products manufacturer to continue temporarily in its American operations the use of methods that violated U.S. environmental laws. I would expect that, in any universalist bankruptcy convention, the United States and other coun tries would reserve the right to reject such assertions of jurisdiction. If that is correct, it will mean that reorganizing a multinational company in a purely "universalist" system may still require the ex-post approval of every foreign country involved.95 To put it another way, if bank ruptcy were to become universalist while the remainder of regulatory law remained territorial, the system would have to grapple with a new, problematic interface between the two. In a territorial system, this problem is much less acute, because the courts that compete for juris diction are both domestic courts of the same country.
Subject matter jurisdiction is not the only complex new interface that universalism would create. Economically-minded scholars long have insisted that the entitlements of a creditor should not change when a collection case moves from a state forum into a bankruptcy fo rum. 96 One reason is that the change would give legal strategy an even greater role in determining outcomes. 97 The change in entitlements that would occur on the filing of bank ruptcy in a universalist system would far exceed any that now occurs domestically. For example, assume that, in a universalist system, a U.S. bank holds a right of setoff in the funds of the debtor that is the equivalent of a security interest under U.S. law. Also assume that the debtor's home country, Luxembourg, treats the holder of a setoff as an unsecured creditor. If the bank exercises its right of setoff before bankruptcy, U.S. law will govern and the bank will recover in full. But if the debtor files bankruptcy before the setoff, Luxembourg law gov erns and the bank may recover only a few cents on the dollar. Which 95. For example, in a reorganization case, the forum would first decide what reorganiza tion was preferred and permitted under the law of the forum. Before that reorganization could be implemented, each other country involved would have to pass on whether it would recognize the provisions that would have effects in the country not achievable in a reorgani zation under local law.
96. See, e.g. , Douglas G. Baird, Loss Distribution, Forum Shopping, and Ban kruptcy: A Reply to Warren, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 815, 822 (1987) ("Whenever we must have a legal rule to distribute losses in bankruptcy, we must also have a legal rule that distributes the same loss outside of bankruptcy. All Jackson and I advocate is that these two rules be the same.").
97. See Lynn M. LoPucki, Should the Secured Credit Ca rve Out Apply Only in Bank ruptcy? A Sys tems/Strategic Analysis, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1483, 1498-509 (1997) (discuss ing strategies by which parties could defeat a rule that applied only in bankruptcy). of these will occur probably will depend on whether the debtor dis closes its intention to the bank before it files. That, in turn, may de pend on the relationship between the debtor and the bank. Similar games could be played with the differences between jurisdictions in their treatment of security interests, wage claims, or tort claims.98
III. IN DEFENSE OF TERRITORIALITY
Professors Guzman and Rasmussen both assume that three kinds of creditors represent all who exist.99 In their terminology, "strongly nonadjusting creditors" are those who are unwilling or unable to ad just their terms of credit to take account of the risk of nonpayment. Guzman assumes there are few strongly nonadjusting creditors and that nearly all of them are tort creditors.100 "Weakly nonadjusting creditors" extend credit on the same terms to all borrowers in a cate gory, without regard to differences in the likelihood that the various borrowers in the category will repay. "Fully adjusting creditors" cal culate a set of terms specific to the particular borrower.101 The ad justments made by the latter two groups are perfect, in the sense that creditors in both groups always get precisely the return they antici pated.102
Using these assumptions, Guzman proceeds to demonstrate that the distortion in lending terms under universalism is less than is the distortion in lending terms under territoriality, and that the adjusting creditors' costs of acquiring the information they need to fix lending terms are lower under universalism than under territoriality. Lastly, Guzman asserts that territoriality is vulnerable to forum shopping through the international movement of assets. I address each of these critiques of territoriality separately.
A. Distortion in Lending Terms from In complete Adjustment
The low levels of distortion costs in Guzman's model of univer salism are the product of two unrealistic aspects of his assumptions.
The first is that nearly all creditors adjust; the second is that each creditor that adjusts does so perfectly. The first assumption makes the 98. See id.
99. See Guzman, supra note 4, at 2182-83 (defining "weakly nonadjusting," and "strongly nonadjusting" creditors); id. at 2184 (defining "fully adjusting creditor"); Rasmussen, supra note 35, at 2266 (opting to apply Guzman's categories).
100. See Guzman, supra note 4, at 2182 (appearing to use the terms "nonadjusting" and "tort" interchangeably).
101. See id. at 2183-84.
102 See, e.g., id. at 2189 ("Notice that, despite the presence of this distortion, weakly nonadjusting creditors are not 'cheated' in any way. That is, over their full portfolio of loans, they receive an expected return that is adjusted for the overall risk they face.").
pool of nonadjusting creditors small so that Guzman can dismiss it as de minimis.103 The second assumption enables him to ignore the risk that, in the complex labyrinth of a universalist system, strategically minded debtors could extract wealth transfers from creditors by sur prise.
Professor Guzman criticizes the Mexico wage priority example in which I first made the latter point.104 In my example, Mexican workers in a universalist system extended too much credit to their U.S. em ployers because they did not anticipate the application of the less gen erous priority for wages in U.S. law. Perhaps because miscalculation by an adjusting creditor is impossible under Guzman's assumptions, he misinterpreted my concern to be that Mexican values were not hon ored in the bankruptcy distribution.105 The honoring of national val ues is, as Guzman points out, merely a zero sum game. But over ex tension of credit resulting from imperfect adjustment is an issue of efficiency that Guzman's perfect adjustment assumption causes him to ignore.
In reality, creditors do not adjust their credit terms perfectly.
Some overestimate and others underestimate the likelihood of repay ment. The two do not cancel each other out. Debtors tend to borrow more heavily from those who overestimate (an adverse selection ef fect). The result is a continuing subsidy from the least sophisticated creditors to the most opportunistic debtors.106 The magnitude of this subsidy under a given international bankruptcy system will vary with the level of deception and error possible in that system.
The level of error and deception would be higher in a universalist system than in the current territorial one. In a universalist system, a successful deceit or forum shop could change the law governing the distribution of the entire estate. Under territoriality, a successful de ceit or forum shop rarely can affect all of the assets of the debtor com pany; it would change the law governing only the particular assets in volved.
The reaction of havens might further increase the possible variance in outcomes under universalism. That is, under universalism, havens would compete for cases by adopting laws more favorable to those who chose the fora for the bankruptcies of multinational companies, while the laws of other countries remained the same. Because the stakes would be larger for havens under universalism, their laws would 103. See id. at 2194 (arguing that the amount at stake in the treatment of nonadjusting debt is small).
104. See id. at 2205-06.
105. See id. at 2206.
106. See LoPucki, supra note 92, at 1954-58. become more extreme. That, in turn, would increase deceit and forum shopping even further.
B. Information Costs
In Professor Guzman's model, each adjusting creditor seeks full in formation regarding each of its debtor's creditors and each possibly applicable bankruptcy law, calculates its return from each possible bankruptcy proceeding,107 and uses the result to fix its terms of credit.
Because Guzman assumes that, under universalism, the creditors know the home country whose law will determine the distribution, while under territoriality the laws of several countries will interact to determine the distribution, Guzman concludes that creditors' costs of gathering information to price credit will be greater under territorial . ty 10 8
In reality, few creditors make the kinds of calculations Guzman de scribes. Because bankruptcies are relatively uncommon, the size of the potential return from them is only a small factor in determining the appropriate rate of interest to charge.109 At the time they extend credit in the current territorial system, most creditors have only the dimmest idea of what their debtors' situations would be in some future bankruptcy. They fix lending rates and terms based on past returns from similar loans, not on the complex calculations Guzman sup poses.110 Hence, they have no need for the pieces of data he suggests they would collect. Because active lenders have experience under ter ritoriality -the system currently in operation -they already have the information they need to fix rates and terms. The world would need considerable experience with universalism to reach the same level.
C. Movement of Assets
Professor Guzman asserts, without argument, that, in a territorial regime, "[forum shopping] can be accomplished simply by moving as-107. See Guzman, supra note 4, at 2200 (stating the formula for calculating the number of pieces of information supposedly necessary to price credit).
108. See id.
109. See, e.g. , Ronald J. Mann , Strategy and Force in the Liquidation of Secured Debt, 96 MICH. L. REV. 159, 239 (1997) ("[I]n practice both involuntary liquidation of collateral and bankruptcy are quite unusual, even within the relatively small universe of loans that fall into distress.").
110. See id. at 242 n.343 (quoting a banking executive as saying that a proposal to limit secured creditors to 80% of their collateral "would have no effect whatsoever on bank lending" because "loan officers responsible for origination 'don't think or give one hoot about bankruptcy/workout scenarios. They hope to hell it won't happen .... [I]t won't affect one iota how the banks initiate loans' " (citing a telephone interview with a Bank Division Manager (Mar. 6, 1997) (brackets in original)).
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[Vol. 98:2216 sets from one jurisdiction to another."111 Such forum shopping does occur, but has not been a particularly serious problem in the current territorialist regime. Elsewhere I have described two possible limita tions on such forum shopping: (1) local legal restrictions and contract devices that can, and today do, largely prevent such transfers and (2) treaties or conventions that could provide for the return of fl eeing as sets.112 Professor Westbrook asserts that I consider such treaties or conventions to be a necessary prerequisite to the operation of a terri torial regime.113 It should be apparent from what I already have said that I do not. A territorial regime is already in operation.
IV. RASMUSSEN'S CONTRACTUALISM
A. Th e Fo undations of Co ntractualism
Contract is the principal weapon in the economic arsenal. The ar gument goes as follows: No matter what current conditions obtain in an economic system, they can be improved by permitting the parties to enter into contracts. That parties voluntarily agree to the contract terms, the economist argues, proves that those terms make each better off than they would have been without them. Because the contract does not bind third parties, no one is worse off. Thus, every contract is a net gain for society as a whole and, in the absence of transaction costs (which economic theorists seem generally content to ignore), complete freedom to contract optimizes social organization -a condi tion referred to as "efficiency." No better outcome than that achieved by contracting is possible; if such an outcome could exist, the econo mist supposes, the parties would have contracted for it and split the gain among them.
Economically minded scholars have used contractualism to fight regulation in virtually every nook and cranny of the economy, from corp orate governance to the family. Regulation, they say, should be employed only when parties are unable to contract.
Professor Robert Rasmussen was among the first to bring this kind of contractualism to business bankruptcy. In an article published in 1992, he proposed that any debtor and all of its creditors be permitted to choose the law that would apply in the event of the debtor's bank ruptcy.114 They would make the choice from among a "menu" of al ternatives provided by law. In an article published five years later, 111. Guzman, supra note 4, at 2214.
112 See LoPucki, supra note 2, at 758-59.
113. See Westbrook, supra note 5, at 2308. Rasmussen took the idea international.115 Essentially, he proposed that the "menu" of his earlier proposal be the existing bankruptcy laws of all the nations of the world.
By this ingenious proposal, Rasmussen seeks to finesse the choice between universalism and territoriality. No matter what the advan tages of universalism or territoriality, contractualism is guaranteed to be at least as good. Even if one of the other systems were best for every firm (an unlikely possibility), the contracting parties simply would choose it for every firm. And if, as Rasmussen supposes, which system is best differs from firm to firm, contractualism would assure that the parties had the best of both worlds.116
B. The Trouble with Contractualism
The principal weaknesses of Rasmussen's proposal are the weak nesses of the contract paradigm itself. First, the benefits of contractu alism are guaranteed only in the absence of transaction costs,117 yet no contracting ever takes place in the absence of transaction costs. The transaction costs of operating under Rasmussen's proposal would be enormous. Second, the argument for contract only holds so long as third parties are unaffected; if the scheme permits contracting parties to bind third parties and extract value from them, the contracting may no longer have even a tendency toward efficiency. Rasmussen's pro posal would bind noncontracting parties to the choice of forum, mak ing it a possible vehicle for third-party exploitation. Third, the con tract paradigm ignores the possibility that creditors may miscalculate and that such miscalculations are more likely in some systems than in others. Rasmussen's proposed system would be so complex in its op eration that creditors reasonably could not anticipate their treatment. I consider each of these points separately.
Transaction Costs
A multinational company may have thousands -and at the ex treme even hundreds of thousands -of creditors, ranging from inter national banking institutions, to bondholders, trade creditors, employ ees, and even customers who have advanced down payments or relied upon warranties. Apparently recognizing that the costs of actually contracting arp.ong so many parties would be prohibitively expensive, Professor Rasmussen proposes that debtors note their choice of bank-ruptcy system in their articles of incorporation.U8 All creditors are as sumed to have agreed to that choice. Because the circumstances that make the choice of a bankruptcy system appropriate might change, the debtor is free to change its election by amending its articles of incor poration. Rasmussen apparently realizes that sending creditors notice of the debtor's changes in those elections would also be prohibitively expensive, and so does not require it. Instead, he would imply the creditors' consent to a change of election when the change has been on the public record for a reasonable period of time.119
In the resulting system, creditors could be certain which bank ruptcy system the debtor elected only if they searched the corporate records for that information. Under Rasmussen's proposal, the search would be by entity,120 which might necessitate hundreds of searches in numerous jurisdictions for a single corporate group.121 To catch changes in the elections, the creditors would have to repeat their searches at frequent intervals. Rasmussen notes that the searchers might employ information brokers of various kinds -such as Dun & Bradstreet -in the process,122 but Dun & Bradstreet's services are hardly cheap.123 In even the most optimistic view of those costs, they would still exceed the cost to the debtors of simply sending each credi tor notice of each change of election. It follows that Rasmussen must contemplate that most creditors -the smaller ones -will extend their credit without actually knowing the debtor's election. Instead of carefully calculating their return from a bankruptcy filing in the cho sen jurisdiction or jurisdictions, these small creditors will be flying blind. The effect is discussed in the next subsection.
Larger creditors can be expected to require that their debtors fur nish them with notice of changes in the election.124 Knowing that some 118. See Rasmussen, supra note 35, at 2254 ("[C]ontractualism allows each independent corporate entity to specify in its corporate charter the jurisdiction that will handle any bank ruptcy proceeding involving that entity.").
119. See Rasmussen, supra note 35, at 2255.
120. See Rasmussen, supra note 35, at 2254 ("[C]ontractualism allows each independent corporate entity to specify in its corporate charter the jurisdiction that will handle any bank ruptcy proceeding involving that entity."). 124. See Rasmussen, supra note 35, at 2261. ("The firm borrowing the money will simply show the lender the relevant provision in its corporate charter.").
will fail to comply with the requirement, they will also conduct searches. Each search is likely to require some analysis. Recall that the election is not necessarily for the law of any particular country. It may be an election for territoriality or some other combination of sys tems.125 Thus, for every debtor in the world -multinational or notnumerous creditors would have to conduct frequent searches and analyze the results. That analysis might require familiarity with anyor every -one of the bankruptcy systems of the approximately 268 countries of the world.1 2 6 In short, the costs of contracting would be enormous.
Rasmussen responds that the negotiations among estate represen tatives in a territorial system would be both expensive and uncertain in outcome and that as a result "the costs of cooperative territorialism may well exceed those of a bankruptcy selection clause regime. " 1 2 7
That is, however, unlikely. In a territorial regime, negotiation costs are incurred only for the firms that file bankruptcy, only once for each bankruptcy, and only by each of two, or a few, estate representatives.
In a contractualist regime, negotiation costs are incurred for all firms, they are continuous over the life of each firm, and they are incurred by every adjusting creditor of those firms individually.
Externalizing Costs
As noted in the preceding subsection, most creditors will not find it cost-effective to monitor the debtor's election. These creditors must either decline to deal with the debtor (and thus, presumably, with all debtors) or attempt to guess the appropriate terms. To protect against their debtors' opportunism, they should guess that their debtor will choose the most exploitative bankruptcy alternative available, and price their credit accordingly. Given that they would be charged as though they made that choice anyway, debtors would then have to choose the most exploitative alternative available to break even.
Recent experience with asset protection trusts suggests that off shore havens will tailor their laws to provide extremely exploitative alternatives. In the past two decades, about a dozen haven countries 125. See supra text accompanying note 116. Rasmussen defends his contractualist ap proach by analogizing it to generally enforceable "forum selection clauses and choice of law clauses" in contracts. See Rasmussen, supra note 115, at 5 ("Private international law gen erally recognizes the validity of forum-selection clauses and choice of law clauses in private contracts. This principle of contractual choice should be extended to insolvency matters."). There is, however, an important difference. The parties bound by the latter contracts typi cally have actual notice of the provisions. [Vol. 98:2216 have adopted asset protection trust laws that are specifically designed to prevent foreign creditors from collecting debts owing from anyone who avails him or herself of the haven's services.128 The havens do so by validating self-settled spendthrift trusts. These trusts are, in es sence, merely declarations by debtors that their assets should be avail able to themselves, but not to their creditors. These countries protect the assets in the care of their nationals by refusing to recognize foreign judgments, by making the trusts virtually impossible to break, and by recognizing the right of the trustee to move the assets to a different haven in the event that any creditor is foolish enough to attack in the courts of the originally designated haven.129 The existence of these as set protection trust laws demonstrate the willingness of a significant number of countries to enact and enforce laws fo r th e purpose of frus trating debt collection, and to do so for the benefit of anyone capable of bringing substantial foreign business to the haven. Thus, I would expect that, under a contractualist regime, debtors and their major creditors would join in electing to conduct any necessary bankruptcy proceedings in havens that would offer to exploit the other creditors for their benefit. The havens' reward would be the same as with asset protection trusts -the fees that the havens and their citizens could charge for their services.
Rasmussen expresses doubt that the havens effectively could "tar get incompletely-adjusting creditors for appropriation" without also harming fully adj usting creditors.13° But there are numerous ways the havens could do that, even without going outside the bounds of the current bankruptcy practices in industrialized nations. First, the ha vens could disallow the claims of particular typ es of creditors that are unlikely to adjust. That might include all unliquidated tort claims; as is apparently the law of Spain today.131 Alternatively, the haven could disallow all foreign government claims for taxes; that is the bankruptcy law of most countries today.132
128. See Lynn M. LoPucki, Th e Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1, 32-34 (1996) (de scribing the laws).
129. See id. at 36.
130. See Rasmussen, supra note 35, at 2267 ("Thus, even if the amount of weakly nonadjusting creditors is large, it is far from certain that bankruptcy laws can be targeted so as to transfer value from weakly adjusting creditors to debtors on the one hand, while at the same time not to transfer such value from fully adjusting creditors on the other."). Second, the haven could impose minor costs and other procedural barriers to participation in the case. That would target essentially those contract creditors who would not adjust to their exclusion from the distribution. For example, imposing a filing fee for making a claim would tend to make claiming not cost effective for those with the smallest claims. They are the creditors who would be least likely to take account of whether their future extensions of credit were to debt ors who had elected the haven as their forum. Placing the expense of operating a creditors' committee on the creditors rather than on the debtor's estate would have much the same effect.133 Over time, the haven might fine-tune these kinds of burdens so that the creditors without enough at stake to pursue their claims would be precisely the same creditors that did not have enough at stake to adjust their credit terms to avoid repeated exploitation in the future.
A third possibility for targeting small contract creditors would be for the haven to permit the debtor and a simple majority in dollar amount of its creditors (usually just one or two creditors) to impose a plan of reorganization or liquidation on the minority. 134 Rasmussen attempts to compare "the benefits that can be achieved by selecting the most efficient insolvency law" with the "benefits that could be garnered by subordinating the claims of tort victims."135 But, in doing so, he misses the point in four respects. First, the range of creditors vulnerable to attack includes not just tort creditors but also trade creditors, employees, customers, taxing authorities, retirees, per sons with any kind of litigation pending against the debtor, and many others. Second, bankruptcy regimes need not, as Rasmussen asserts, sacrifice the flexibility of contract to assure the compensation of tort creditors. In a territorial regime, the estate representatives and the parties remain free to contract around inefficiencies; they simply can not contract around the obligation to compensate tort creditors136 as they could in a contractualist regime. Third, the loss from failure to compensate tort creditors is not limited to the currently existing amount of tort liability. There is profit in torts such as patent inrevenue authorities or foreign penal demands."); Westbrook, supra note 19, at 37-38 (dis cussing the disallowance of foreign government tax claims in insolvency proceedings). 134. This could be accomplished by autliorizing tliem to ignore tlie nonbankruptcy enti tlements of the other creditors or by permitting the majority to impose a plan by voting that discriminates against tlie minority of voters. If tortfeasors need not pay for their torts, they will commit more of them and we have no reliable way of calculating how many more.137 Last, Rasmussen assumes that the savings to the debtor from filing in an anti-tort haven is limited to the excess of the tort debt over the debtor's insurance.138 But in a world where debtors could opt out of tort liability simply by choosing an anti-tort haven's bankruptcy re gime, debtors would have little incentive to buy liability insurance. 139 Realizing the threat that externalization poses to contractualism, Rasmussen would require that the "bankruptcy regime selected by a firm accord at least nominal priority to tort victims similar to what they achieve in their home country"140 and permit any country to en force it by refusing to enforce a forum-selection clause "as applied to the involuntary creditor."141 Despite my prodding, 142 Rasmussen does not say how the country refusing to enforce would give effect to its de cision. I can see only a single way: by asserting territorial jurisdiction over the assets within its borders in favor of the involuntary creditor. By this move, Rasmussen would make his contractualism merely a su perstructure on a territorial base,143 and open a can of worms over which I have already gagged elsewhere.144 tors.145 Guzman reaches that conclusion by positing a universe of three kinds of creditors, none of whom ever lose money as a result of miscalculation or deceit; all creditors who adjust at all charge enough for the credit they extend that on the average they lose nothing . 1 46 Rasmussen realizes the implausibility of Guzman's assumption and recognizes the possibility that debtors can extract value from weakly nonadjusting credhors.147 But, by assuming that category of creditors will "shrink dramatically" as a result of future improvement in private markets for information, he still manages to join in Guzman's conclusion.148 · In reality, miscalculating creditors are ubiquitous. They range from banks that lend on the basis of false financial statements, to bondholders who trade on inadequate or incorrect information, trade creditors who take unwarranted risks in the hopes of increasing sales, and employees or customers who never consider the possibility that they will be creditors at all. None of these types of creditors is likely to disappear as a result of improvements in information markets .
When these creditors suffer losses, they cannot recoup them by charging someone else above-market rates. The market rate is, by definition, the highest rate creditors can charge and still have custom ers.
Creditors that miscalculate too often may indeed be forced out of business and replaced by others who can be fooled less often. But, as I have explained elsewhere, normal turnovers of people and firms will generate a continuous subsidy to those debtors capable of exploiting them.149 When the incentives established in a legal system are poor, an entire industry systematically can miscalculate, producing gigantic, un recoverable losses. Such was the case with the Savings and Loan crisis of the 1980s, in which those institutions suffered losses in excess of 145. See Guzman, supra note 4, at 2189 ("Notice that despite the presence of this distor tion, weakly nonadjusting creditors are not 'cheated' in any way. That is, over their full port folio of loans, they receive an expected return that is adjusted for the overall risk they fa ce."); Rasmussen, supra note 35, at 2265 ("Professor Guzman also demonstrates that weakly nonadjusting creditors cannot be systematically disadvantaged by any given bank ruptcy regime. Regardless of the regime, they will be able to price their so loans so as to ob tain a market rate of return.").
146. See Guzman, supra note 4, at 2180-81.
147. See Rasmussen, supra note 35, at 2266 ("Thus, the dominant strategy for all debtors is to select a bankruptcy regime that transfers value to debtors from weakly nonadjusting creditors.").
148. See Rasmussen, supra note 35, at 2267 ("In light of these observations, the concern over debtor havens must be a concern about the exploitation of strongly nonadjusting credi tors.").
$500 billion on loans.150 Such may also have been the case with recent forum shopping to Delaware in bankruptcy reorganization cases. 151 The best systems for economic organization are simple and intui tive. Territoriality fits that description; contract choice does not. By contrast, contract choice would reward strategic activity by countries, by debtors, and by their major creditors. That activity would be most intense in the period shortly before bankruptcy, when the probability of bankruptcy was high.152 Whether the strategies involved were legal or illegal would matter little in the outcome. Each time an adj usting creditor was surprised by the harshness of its treatment under the law of a bankruptcy haven, the economic loss would be real and unrecov erable. A contract choice system would generate some tendency to ward efficiency, but it might generate a more powerful tendency to ward exploitation.
The problems with Rasmussen's contract choice result largely from the fact that the parties must incur the expense and go to the trouble of contracting regarding bankruptcy at a time when bankruptcy is only a remote possibility.153 Because so few borrowers actually will file bankruptcy, the difference in creditors' expected recoveries resulting from different bankruptcy regimes is likely to be less than the transac tion costs necessary to contract for those recoveries.154 Territoriality offers the same parties the opportunity to contract regarding bank ruptcy only in the cases that reach bankruptcy. That is the context in which bankruptcy contracting is most likely to succeed.
V. CONCLUSION
This round of essays made substantial progress in the international bankruptcy debate. As to Rasmussen's contractualism, the analysis frames essentially three issues. The first is whether future develop ments in information systems will make possible the transmission of a debtor's choice of bankruptcy regimes to, and analysis of that choice by, thousands of individual creditors. The second is the extent to which bankruptcy systems can target for exploitation creditors who do not completely adjust. The third is whether the gains to be had from the exploitation of those creditors are sufficiently large that the system will pursue them at the expense of efficiency. In my opinion, contrac tualism is likely to fall short in all three areas.
As to universalism, this exchange highlights the fact that it is no longer a single proposal, but is now a multitude of them. That multi tude includes the adoption of a world-wide law governing debtor creditors relations and the establishment of a system of international bankruptcy courts as well as the traditionally universalist idea that the court of the debtor's home country would administer the worldwide assets of the debtor according to the law of that home country.
Westbrook and I agree that traditional universalism would present no great problem in a world in which the bankruptcy and priority laws of all countries were essentially the same. We disagree on whether an international convention could establish a traditionally universalist system without first eliminating the sharp differences that exist among the bankruptcy systems of the various countries. As I see it, the re sults of such a premature attempt at universalism would be rampant forum shopping by multinational companies and their financiers for favorable systems and the rise of offshore bankruptcy havens that would specialize in providing such systems. Choosing universalism prematurely may be choosing, in effect, to have most multinational bankruptcies take place in secret in Bermuda or the Cayman Islands -under laws made by the legislatures of those countries.
Assuming I am correct in that analysis, the universalist guerillas who exhort bankruptcy judges to surrender local assets today to "home country" courts that will distribute them differently inject un certainty and injustice without advancing the cause of reform. Bank ruptcy professionals, including bankruptcy judges, understandably look forward to the time in which they will be free of sovereign power.
But, if they are not more cautious, they may destroy the territorial sys tem in which they now practice before the foundations of a viable new system are in place.
